particular on trade and migration; the literature on interwar protectionism; and the literature on the links between trade and warfare.
DEFINING GLOBALIZATION
Globalization has many facets, several of which are noneconomic (e.g., international criminal justice or the globalization of culture). Economic historians have, not surprisingly, focused on the economic dimensions of the phenomenon. In this essay, therefore, when speaking of "globalization" I primarily mean the integration of international markets for commodities, labor, and capital. By the integration of markets, I mean reductions in the costs of doing business internationally -of moving goods, people, or capital between countries or continents. Those costs could fall because of better technology -such as better navigation techniques, the discovery of new ocean routes, the construction of canals, more efficient forms of overland or maritime transport -or because of political factors promoting international economic integration, such as the emergence of geopolitical stability or more liberal domestic trade policies.
Technological transfer is another important economic dimension of globalization that is crucial to the long-run dynamics of economic growth. I will occasionally allude to it, as well.
As O'Rourke and Williamson (2001) emphasize, globalization thus defined will be reflected in declining price gaps between markets. Ceteris paribus falling costs will lead to more trade (or migration, or capital flows, as the case may be), which is why it makes sense to look at the size of flows as well as price gaps. It seems reasonable on a priori grounds to expect that price gaps between markets that were closer together fell earlier than price gaps between markets that were further apart, and that ceteris paribus price gaps fell earlier for more valuable commodities than for cheaper and bulkier ones. O'Rourke and Williamson argued, based on the evidence available to them at the time, that intercontinental price gaps only started to fall systematically in the nineteenth century. The claim gave rise to an large literature (for a recent survey see Federico 2018) . We now know that while the volume of trade and the speed of price convergence were indeed much more impressive in the nineteenth century than before, evidence of price convergence can also be found during the early modern period (see for example Pim de Zwart (2016) on the trade between the Netherlands and Asia).
O'Rourke and Williamson (2009) themselves argue that Vasco da Gama played
an important role in integrating Eurasian spice markets.
There is, of course, a vast literature on international trade during the early modern, medieval, and even classical periods: long-distance markets may have been characterized by large price gaps, but flows of commodities, and perhaps more importantly of slaves, technology, germs, and specie were sufficient at times to have transformative effects on economies (see inter alia Janet AbuLughod 1989; Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez 2004; Ronald Findlay and O'Rourke 2007; and Andrew Wilson and Alan K. Bowman (eds.) 2017) . And just as you can find evidence of globalization before the nineteenth century, depending upon your definition, so also can you find evidence of deglobalization, often linked to geopolitical upheaval such as the end of the pax Mongolica, the disintegration of the Timurid Empire, or political crises in Persia or China (Robert S. Lopez 1987, pp. 385-389; Morris Rossabi 1990) . But as we will see, just as the globalization of the nineteenth century and later was different from what had gone before, so were the backlashes produced by it.
HAS GLOBALIZATION ENDED?
The 1930s remain the canonical example of deglobalization. That decade saw a worldwide increase in tariffs, as well as widespread resort to quotas, exchange controls, multiple exchange rates biased against imports, and a variety of clearing arrangements. In contrast, average tariffs barely rose between 2008 and 2017, although 7.3% of world exports were facing higher tariffs in the latter year In summary, while the events of 2016 were dramatic, it is inaccurate to suggest that the world has, to date, experienced extensive deglobalization. That could still change in the future, however, and even if it does not no-one could deny that the successful votes for Brexit and Trump, as well as the unsuccessful 2017 vote for the French National Front, the March 2018 election results in Italy, and support for populist parties elsewhere in Europe, represent a revolt against the established order in general, and -at least in part -against globalization in particular. To what extent does economic history speak to the causes of this revolt, or help us to understand how to respond to it?
THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The argument that the populist revolts of 2016 represented, at least in part, a backlash against globalization rests on three assertions. First, the world economy became significantly more integrated after 1990, and particularly after 2001 when China entered the WTO. Second, this globalization had significant distributional effects. And third, those distributional effects ended up having political consequences. While there is little dispute about the first of these assertions, the second and third are hotly contested.
During the 1990s, economic historians tried to make precisely the same threestep argument to explain the anti-globalization backlash of the late nineteenth century. 6 First, they argued that the late nineteenth century international economy was integrating at an impressive rate: that globalization, viewed as a process, was dramatic during this period. Technological change was largely responsible, notably steamships, railroads, and the telegraph (e.g. Kenneth D. Following scholars such as Knick Harley (1980) , O'Rourke and Williamson (1994) used price evidence to make the case for trans-Atlantic commodity markets, and they drew on work by other authors, such as A.J.H. Latham and Larry Neal (1983) and Collins (1996) , to make the case for commodity markets more generally. Taken in conjunction with the evidence on transport costs (Harley 1988 ) and trade volumes, it is clear that the nineteenth century saw a dramatic integration of commodity markets. It is also clear that international markets for labor and capital became much better integrated over the course of the nineteenth century. By the end of the century, over one million Europeans were leaving the continent every year, and there were substantial outflows from China and India, as well. Foreign investments as a share of world GDP rose from 7% in 1870 to almost 20% on the eve of World War I Williamson 1998, Maurice Obstfeld and Taylor 2004) .
Trade and income distribution in the late nineteenth century and today
Second, the 1990s literature argued that commodity market integration and mass migration had significant distributional effects, although these varied across countries. Let me start with trade. Ceteris paribus, narrowing commodity price gaps raised New World agricultural prices and European manufactured goods prices, while they lowered European agricultural prices and New World manufactured goods prices. O'Rourke and Williamson (1994) used CGE (computable general equilibrium) techniques to argue that these price shocks benefited abundant factors and hurt scarce factors, in classic Heckscher-Ohlin fashion. In particular, falling transport costs hurt British landowners and benefited British workers, while they had the opposite effects in the United States. 8 The impact was significantly bigger in Britain, reflecting its greater openness to international trade. O'Rourke et al. (1996) provided econometric evidence for a small panel of seven "Atlantic economy" countries that relative goods prices were related to relative factor prices in line with Heckscher-Ohlin theory. Williamson (2002) Regarding the econometric approach of O' Rourke et al. (1996) : a panel regression with 7 countries and 8 time periods might not strike people nowadays as providing particularly compelling evidence. On the other hand, it was at least a theory-consistent econometric test of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which is rare enough. Since this is a general equilibrium theory, which predicts a relationship between a vector of economy-wide goods prices and a vector of economy-wide factor prices, the appropriate unit of observation is the economy, rather than regions or industries. As Pinelopi Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik (2007, p. 58) say, "The general equilibrium nature of the Heckscher-Ohlin model makes it extremely hard to bring it to the data. Given that the model's predictions refer to economy-wide factor returns, one has only one observation per year to work with." Not surprisingly, therefore, later researchers such as Kris Mitchener and Se Yan (2014) , when revisiting these issues, have established a link between trade (i.e., traded goods prices) and income distribution using model-based simulation methods.
The most influential work linking trade and income distribution today is, deservedly, the work of David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson. Autor et al. (2013) show that US regions which were more heavily exposed to rising Chinese import competition between 1990 and 2007 experienced higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, and lower wages. Since they "circumvent the degrees-of-freedom problem endemic to estimating the labor-market consequences of trade" (p. 2124) by focusing on regions, they are not testing long-run Heckscher-Ohlin theory. On the other hand, their research suggests that the "short run" regional disequilibria arising from major trade shocks are much more persistent and severe than previously thought, and that we need to worry about these more than we once did. That, in turn, suggests an agenda for future historical research, assuming that the required regional data are available.
Migration, wages, and employment in the late 19 th century and today
When it came to the impact of mass migration on income distribution, the literature of the 1990s used a similar mixture of techniques. Since the scholars involved were interested in economy-wide effects, there was the same degrees of freedom problem as that described above, and similar responses to the problem.
George Boyer et al. (1994) , O'Rourke et al. (1994) and O'Rourke and Williamson (1995) used CGE models. Taylor and Williamson (1997) assumed a three-factor (land, labor, and capital) production function, and estimated the elasticity of substitution econometrically using data for a panel of 14 countries. This elasticity, together with information on factor shares, yielded aggregate labor demand elasticities, which allowed them to estimate the wage impact of migration-induced labor supply shocks. For example, the 24% increase in the US labor force between 1870 and 1910 was estimated to have lowered US wages by
8% (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999, p. 155).
Other research tried to circumvent the degrees of freedom problem by using variation across cities or states, in particular in the US. As in the case of trade, this approach cannot deal with the issue of whether or not there were economywide effects of immigration on wages. On the other hand, such studies may pick up a local effect if intra-regional labor market adjustment is sluggish, as the work of Autor et al. suggests is the case today.
By and large, the literature suggests that nineteenth-century immigration put pressure on local US labor markets. Hatton and Williamson (1998, Chapter 8) found that higher rates of immigration were correlated across US states with higher rates of native-born out-migration, controlling for a variety of other factors, while Collins (1997) found a negative correlation between foreign-born and African-American net migration to a sample of northern US states and cities.
Claudia Goldin (1994) found a negative city-level relationship between wages and the proportion of the population that was foreign-born: a 1% increase in the latter lowered wages by between 1 and 1.5%, an effect big enough that it cannot plausibly be attributed to composition effects (as noted by Hatton and Zachary Ward 2018) , and notable in the context of the evidence on intra-regional labor market adjustment provided by Collins, Hatton, and Williamson. There is a vigorous debate regarding whether present-day immigration lowers wages or employment levels. To take some recent examples, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) where the impact on wages might be muted; or a similar regulatory framework (involving not much regulation) for both categories of workers, rather than segmentation between legal and illegal workers. Bin Xie (2017) further suggests that manufacturing jobs may have been more homogenous then than now, implying less scope for natives to specialize so as to avoid competition from immigrants; and (citing Joshua Rosenbloom 1996) that inter-regional mobility within the US may have been less strong in the nineteenth century, implying greater local impacts for econometricians to find. Modern minimum wage laws are another reason why wage effects might be smaller today than 100 years ago.
Having said that, Abramitzky and Boustan's (2017) judgment that immigration "creates winners and losers in the native population and among existing immigrant workers, reducing the wages of low-skilled natives, encouraging some native born to move away from immigrant gateway cities, and spurring capital investment" seems reasonable. So does the frequent finding that the greatest negative wage impacts of immigration may be felt by previous immigrants. We might expect the short-and long-run impacts of immigration to be different, with accumulation and technological responses to immigration potentially muting its wage impact (for a survey, see Ethan Lewis 2013). We might also expect the impact of immigration to vary depending on the nature of the flows and the institutional and economic context. In summary, the literature on the late nineteenth century found that globalization created both winners and losers, with the most prominent losers being European landowners and native-born New World workers. What was the political impact of this?
Backlash in the late nineteenth century and today
The third step in the argument that late nineteenth-century globalization undermined itself was that the distributional effects of migration and trade led to an anti-globalization backlash. When using regional data to test whether trade or migration are linked to voting behavior at the local level, there is a problem analogous to the "degrees of freedom" issue discussed earlier. Such exercises will miss any national-level political effects of globalization operating equally across districts. Despite this, when Goldin (1994) studied 1915 Congressional voting on the US Literacy Test, she found that higher local wage growth lowered the likelihood of an anti-immigration vote. Timmer and Williamson (1998) developed a cross-country index of immigration policy for a panel of countries, and found that policy became less restrictive the higher were unskilled wages relative to average incomes. Put these findings together with those on the impact of immigration on wages, and you have a clear case of a dimension of globalization (in this case migration) undermining itself.
The 1990s evidence on the determinants of nineteenth-century trade policy was more qualitative, although it was able to draw on an extensive political science literature, such as Peter Gourevitch (1977) and Ronald Rogowski (1989) . the ability of the Duke of Wellington to deliver the House of Lords, and the constitutional reasons why the Duke decided to do so, and so on. Imagine our successors looking back at our own period in 50 years time, and asking students whether the turmoil of 2016 was due more to economics or to culture. Is it not likely that the answer to that question will be the same as it usually is, when students are given the choice between two pedagogically useful but overly simplistic alternatives -that it was, in fact, a bit of both? This does not automatically mean that voters were being "rational", in the sense that they were voting in their own economic self-interest. Take for example the evidence presented by Sascha O. Becker et al. (2017) and Thiemo Fetzer (2018) showing a clear link between austerity policies and the pro-Brexit vote in Britain. This is a good example of economic factors driving an anti-globalization vote, but it is not a good example of economically rational voting for the simple reason that Conservative austerity policies had nothing to do with the European Union.
However, other evidence on twenty-first century voting behavior is more consistent with the late nineteenth-century anti-globalization backlash narrative. 
Becker et al. find that migrant inflows from Eastern

What is to be done?
One shortcoming of O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) , in my opinion, is that its view of the political process was excessively simplistic. Politics was effectively In this view, states and markets are complements rather than substitutes, in that state action can help to maintain political support for openness. It is possible that financial globalization and greater competition for mobile direct investment may today be placing constraints on the ability of states to finance such policies (Rodrik 2017) . On the other hand, there has surely never been a more tightly integrated group of economies in human history than the 28 -soon to be 27 -member states of the European Union. Despite the hyper-globalization linking its members, the EU seems to be able to accommodate wildly differing preferences regarding the share of GDP going to government. Setting aside Ireland, whose GDP statistics are not comparable with those in other countries, general government expenditure as a share of GDP ranged in 2016 from a low of 34% in Romania to a high of 56.4% in France. The ratio was less than 40% in eight member states, and higher than 50% in five. 9 The late nineteenth-century lesson that globalization and pro-worker state intervention can go hand in hand may not be out of date yet.
Economic history also suggests that states can directly cooperate with each other to avoid mutually harmful regulatory races to the bottom that might undermine support for openness. Huberman and Christopher Meissner (2010) Italy bring its own regulatory standards up to international levels. Alan Milward (2010) emphasized that European integration was an essential part of that continent's response to the traumas of the interwar period, since it boosted the capacity of states to deal with the problems facing them. It was important for countries to be able to reap the benefits of trade, but this could not come at the expense of broader social and political objectives. "The problem genuinely was how to construct a commercial framework which would not endanger the levels 9 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tec00023 of social welfare which had been reached ... The Treaties of Rome had to be also an external buttress to the welfare state" (Milward 2010, p. 216) . And so the Treaty of Rome (1957) envisaged not just a customs union, but inter alia a Common Agricultural Policy, regional policy, and the harmonization of social policies. The supranational elements of the European project were a logical consequence. These always bothered the British, but they were (and still are) seen as essential in maintaining popular support for European economic integration (O'Rourke 2018b).
THE GREAT DEPRESSION
O'Rourke and Williamson suggest that the deglobalization of the interwar period was not solely the result of an exogenous shock, namely the Great War, but had its roots in the anti-globalization backlash of the late nineteenth century (1999, p. 286). We did not discuss in detail the extent to which this was really the case, but it merits reflection. I think that we were on fairly solid ground when it comes to US immigration policies, for example. There is a clear continuity between the gradually tightening restrictions over the course of the late nineteenth century, the introduction of the US Immigration Act of 1917, and the immigration quotas of the 1920s. The European agricultural protection introduced before 1914 survived the war intact, and it remains with us today. The late nineteenth century also saw a shift towards protecting heavy industry in particular, and manufacturing more generally, from British competition. This phenomenon was so ubiquitous that Robert Allen (2011) describes it as being part of a developmental "standard model." It was adopted by countries across the globe as they regained tariff autonomy in the twentieth century.
On the other hand, it would be wrong to suggest that the outbreak of World War I, and the onset of the Great Depression, did not represent important discontinuities that had serious negative consequences for the openness of the world economy. To what extent could either of these be regarded as examples of globalization undermining itself, as opposed to exogenous shocks imposed upon an otherwise robust and open international system? Let me start with the Depression. We know from Peter Temin (1989) and Barry Eichengreen (1992) that the gold standard and Great Depression were inextricably linked. The gold standard was part of the institutional infrastructure underpinning global capital markets during the late nineteenth century. Going back on gold in the 1920s was an important part of the attempt to recreate the highly globalized pre-war world, and was seen by politicians as signaling a commitment to a generally open international system. To that extent you could regard the Great Depression that followed as being to some extent caused by 1920s globalization. Perhaps that is a slightly forced argument. A more compelling reason to view the Depression as having been caused, at least to some extent, by the globalization that preceded it, is the role played by international capital flows in transmitting the crisis around the world. This was presumably always self-evident to scholars of countries such as Germany, and was a central focus of Charles Kindleberger (1973) , but I think that Anglo-Saxon economic historians have tended, since the work of Eichengreen and Temin, to think about the Depression more in Mundell-Fleming terms, with exchange rates, interest rates, and monetary and fiscal policy being at the heart of the analysis.
This tendency fits well with Keynes's repeated denunciations of interwar macroeconomic policy-making. Since 2008, however, and in particular since the Eurozone crisis of 2010, it has become more natural to once again think of the Depression in Europe in terms of a sudden stop of capital flows, a perspective recently exemplified by Olivier Accominotti and Eichengreen (2016) . Seen in this perspective, the Great Depression in Europe appears more clearly as a negative consequence of a particular dimension of globalization, namely capital mobility:
when the lending stopped countries like Germany found themselves obliged to cut expenditure, while their financial systems came under strain as foreign depositors withdrew money from banks (Eichengreen 2015, pp. 137-144) . And perhaps the German historical literature debating whether Chancellor Brüning, widely criticized for his economically and politically destructive austerity policies, could have behaved in a less dangerous manner resonates more strongly today than it once did to observers of the Eurozone periphery.
To the extent that the Depression was caused by malfunctioning international capital markets, or the gold standard that was thought at the time to underpin them, we have yet another case of globalization undermining itself, since the Depression was the major cause of interwar protectionism (Smoot-Hawley, which had its roots earlier, notwithstanding). Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) show that protectionism during the 1930s was associated with adherence to the gold standard, a point that had earlier been noted by, among others, the League of Nations (1943, p. 31) . Staying on gold longer meant balance of payments problems and a more protracted depression, and doing so deprived policymakers of alternative ways of addressing these problems.
Even worse, the Depression promoted political extremism, notably but not only in Germany. Gregori Galofré-Vilà et al. (2017) To what extent should we think of the war as an exogenous shock hitting the world economy in 1914? Or did it represent, at least to some extent, an even more dramatic form of anti-globalization backlash? Tooze and Fertik (2014) make what is perhaps the most direct connection between globalization and war: capital flows and technology transfer helped Russia converge on the established powers. This disrupted pre-existing geopolitical equilibria and led Germany in particular to devise military strategies to counter the threat. They could have added that the spread of the Industrial Revolution to Germany had earlier undermined the geopolitical equilibrium in Europe, perhaps to an even more fundamental extent. Similarly, the spread of modern growth to Japan undermined Asian stability in the first half of the twentieth century. If there is an analogy with today it is both obvious and worrying: few would dispute that Chinese growth has been intimately linked to globalization or that this will have consequences for the international balance of power. Tooze (2006) and Michael Barnhart (1987) have shown how a concern to achieve strategic self-sufficiency was both a cause and an effect of the drive to war during the interwar period in Germany and Japan respectively. Roberto Bonfatti and O'Rourke (2018) show more generally how a follower country's strategic dependence on imported raw materials can, in conjunction with the naval hegemony of an established power, give the follower country an incentive to launch pre-emptive wars in the hope of gaining strategic self-sufficiency.
Higher costs of war in high-wage globalized economies can also give politicians an incentive to gamble on rapid offensives, in the hope of striking a knockout blow (Jari Eloranta and Mark Harrison 2010, p. 137 ).
Again, if there is a contemporary parallel, it is with China. Like Britain and Germany in the nineteenth century, it has been undergoing rapid industrialization and structural change, and it has become far more dependent on international trade. On the import side it relies heavily on foreign oil, much of which passes through the Straits of Malacca; on the export side it has toyed with using its near monopoly of rare earths for strategic purposes. The international state system has a poor record as it is of peacefully accommodating the arrival of newcomers to the top table, and there is a fascinating theoretical and historical literature on the topic that is too vast to be summarized here (e.g. Robert Gilpin 1981 , Robert Powell 2006 . If China started to doubt that it could rely on the market to provide it with the food and raw materials it requires, the world could become a much more dangerous place.
One of the features of interwar trade that struck contemporary observers as particularly dangerous was its decreasingly multilateral nature, with countries trading more and more with their colonial possessions or spheres of influence.
As Folke Hilgerdt (1935) put it, "As bilateralism particularly renders the supply of raw materials to certain countries difficult, it threatens to lead to an intensified fight for influence upon (or the domination of) the undeveloped countries, and thereby to political controversies, which may adversely affect all forms of peaceful collaboration between nations". de Bromhead et al. (2018) show that discriminatory UK trade policies can explain over 70% of the increase in the British Empire's share of UK imports after 1930. And so it is no surprise that Article 1 of the GATT prohibited discriminatory trade policies, subject to a number of well-known exceptions. The interwar period suggests that the greatest costs of aggressive and discriminatory trade policies can be political rather than economic. It is in this context that upholding the international rule of law is so important, and that the implications of Brexit and Trump become potentially alarming. In particular, the US refusal to reappoint judges to the WTO's Appellate Body threatens to render the work of that body impossible. of history suggests that if governments push anything too far, including markets in general, and globalization in particular, a reaction is to be expected. Rather than promoting ever-closer integration in an already highly globalized world, maybe advocates of openness should declare victory and focus on how to protect individuals and regions from the risks that markets, both domestic and international, inevitably give rise to.
There is a final contribution that economic historians, like all historians, can bring to present-day debates about the political upsets of 2016, the causes of populism more generally, and the potential implications -some of which are very worrying -for the international order. As economists, we are trained to look for patterns and to seek general explanations for entire classes of phenomena rather than specific explanations for individual historical events. But as historians we are trained to recognize the uniqueness of individual events and acknowledge the roles played in them by context, contingency, and the choices made by individual actors. This is the creative tension that lies at the heart of our discipline and makes it so fascinating. And the perspective of the historian is important today, since it reminds us that we and our leaders enjoy free will, which we can exercise for better or for worse. Nothing is inevitable. In dangerous times that is a useful thought to bear in mind.
